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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendants William C. Card, William Lane Card and
Architectural Specialties, Inc. object to Plaintiff's attempt
to redefine the issues in this appeal.

Apparently the

Plaintiff has decided that it would prefer if this Court would
review some.other issues more favorable to the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's attempt to alter the issues here is further
indication that plaintiff does not understand the legal theory
of alter ego or the trial court's inappropriate reliance on
summary judgment in this case, and ignores disputed material
facts.
As outlined in appellant's brief, Issue I is:

summary

judgment is not appropriate in this "alter ego" case, because
"alter ego" is generally a question of fact.

Specifically in

this case, numerous material elements critical to plaintiff's
theory remain in factual dispute.

Plaintiff's brief does not

address either the factual nature of alter ego or the relative
weight to be given to the various elements.
Instead of addressing the proper issues as framed by the
Appellant, the Plaintiff argues false issues, such as whether
Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as against
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. (hereinafter A.S.M.I.).
(Appellee's Brief, p. 1)

Whether a judgment could have been

entered against A.S.M.I, on the unpaid open account is not an
issue on appeal and, indeed, is not even an issue in this
case.

Appellants, and not Plaintiff, have properly framed the

issues in this appeal for this Court's review,

Cf. Yee v.

City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992),

(Supreme

Court appellants seeking review have the preogative to frame
the appropriate issues.)

The Court should not be led astray

from the legitimate issues by Plaintiff's "non-issues."

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's alleged statement of facts, even if it was
uncontroverted, would be insufficient to entitle the Plaintiff
to summary judgment in this case.

Many of Plaintiff's "facts"

are unfounded and exaggerated in order to stretch the fabric
of fact to cover the gaping chasm between the law and the
Plaintiff's case for summary judgment.

And moreover, instead

of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Defendants, Plaintiff considers only its own version of its
case.
Plaintiff admits that A.S.M.I, was properly incorporated,
issued stock, adopted Articles of Incorporation and elected
directors and officers.

(Brief of Appellee, p. 4.)

corporate books were kept.
formalities observed.

Separate

Corporate meetings were held and

(R. 161, 162, 141)

Short of actual

fraud, which is not alleged in this case, it is difficult to
imagine why any court should set aside A.S.M.I.'s corporate
form.

The most that Plaintiff can show is that the two

corporations in this case have shared office space, and
occasionally allowed office employees to sign for each others'
deliveries and to stamp each others' mail when received.
These innocuous activities hardly form a valid basis for the
alter ego liability of Defendants Card.

3

Plaintiff accuses Defendants of "alter ego" because,
according to Plaintiff, other A.S.M.I, suppliers may have
misunderstood the difference and structure of the two separate
corporations.

Aside from the fact that the assertion is

entirely conjectural, Plaintiff's evidence is without
foundation and should not be considered by this Court.

There

is no foundation as to who made out these delivery receipts or
what their intention was as to the names listed on them.
These bare documents would not be admissible at trial without
foundation, and should not be considered on mammary judgment.
Plaintiff shouts "Alter ego!" because A.S.M.I, and
Specialties, Inc. cooperated in some undescribed manner on a
project entitled "Foothill Village."

Again, there is no

evidence by affidavit, deposition, interrogatory or otherwise
that identifies or provides any foundation for the documents
from which Plaintiff conjures an assumption that the two
corporations were alter-egos.

The "Foothill Village" project

relationship may have been that of a contractor/subcontractor;
one corporation may have bought limited services from another;
or simply a minor confusion in names of the two corporations.
Our point is that Plaintiff's documentary evidence is
unidentified; its allegations are rank speculation and have
seen more than sufficiently refuted by specific evidence that
the Defendants maintained the corporate integrity of A.S.M.I.

4

In addition to the lack of foundation for Plaintiff's
"evidence," Plaintiff's brief attempts to hide from the
court's view the obvious that Plaintiff contracted with
A.S.H.I., knowing it to be a corporation.

(See Add, "G, "

Invoices, Exh. 4; Add. "I", Exh. 9) There is simply not
enough undisputed evidence to affirm the lower court's summary
judgment in this case.

Defendants are entitled, at least, to

a trial on the merits of each party's factual contentions.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT
A.S.M.I. IS LIABLE IS IRRELEVANT
TO THE ISSUE OF ALTER-EGO
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS CARD AND
SPECIALTIES, INC.
Plaintiff's argument that A.S.M.I, is liable is
irrelevant in this appeal because A.S.M.I, did not contest the
lawsuit below and did not appeal.

For example, we address two

arguments raised in Point I of Plaintiff's brief to
demonstrate Plaintiff's failure to focus on the proper legal
analysis.
First, Plaintiff contends that A.S.M.I, did not dispute
the principal amount owing to Plaintiff.
both irrelevant and misleading.
not contest anything below.

The assertion is

True, Defendant A.S.M.I, did

Indeed, it did not even

participate in the lawsuit because it had been liquidated in
bankruptcy.

This fact does not lead to the conclusion that,

therefore, none of the defendants contested the amount owing.
Defendants Card and Specialties, Inc. attested to the fact
that they had no liability to the Plaintiff.
Affidavits, Add. "C" and "D"; R. 140, 144.)
oath that ''nothing

(See Card
To aver under

is owed" certainly encompasses any question

of "how much is owed."
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A dispute as to how much is owed is also raised by
Plaintiff's own invoices.

Plaintiff's eleven invoices in

Exhibit 4 (See, in part, Add. "G") total over $41,000.00 of
product supplied to A.S.M.I.

Plaintiff, without saying which

of the $41,000.00 in invoices were paid or unpaid, averred
that $13,855.74 was due and owing from A.S.M.I.
Aff., Exh. 9, Add. "I".)

(See Southam

On the other hand, the A.S.M.I.

accounts payable records filed with interrogatory answers show
the amount owing by A.S.M.I, to Plaintiff to be only
$8,471.89.

(R. 41; also, Plf's Exh. 3)

Defendants, as well

as Plaintiff itself, have raised a disputed issue as to the
amount owing.

It is irrelevant whether or not A.S.M.I, itself

did not participate in the lawsuit below or did not "dispute"
the charges.
Second, Plaintiff implies that if the veil is pierced,
interest and fees can be charged to all the Defendants simply
because A.S.M.I, did not participate below.

Defendants denied

any basis for liability for attorney fees and 18% interest on
summary judgment.

(Oppos. Memo, R. 132). They affirmatively

averred that there was not any such written agreement, as
plaintiff argues.

(R. 140, 144)

And, as demonstrated in

Appellants' briefs, there was not even sufficient evidence of
any agreement by the debtor to pay fees and interest on the
open account.

Therefore, it is quite irrelevant whether or

not the liquidated debtor participated below.
7

In sum, the non-issue of whether A.S.M.I, denied
liability does not justify Plaintiff's arguments. The
individual Defendants herein have preserved and framed the
issues of this appeal as to their personal liability for a
corporate obligation.

Whether A.S.M.I, is, or was, liable in

this case is totally irrelevant.

8

POINT II
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PRESENT A
LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS TO PIERCE
THE CORPORATE VEIL OF A.S.M.I.
Plaintiff's argument to pierce the corporate veil in this
case is both weak and misleading.

Defendants have provided

evidence that A.S.M.I, did not fail to observe corporate
formalities, was not undercapitalized, and did not function as
a joint venture, all sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
In this case, observance of the corporate form certainly does
not sanction fraud, promote injustice or allow for an
inequitable result.
liability.

Absent these there cannot be alter ego

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 789 P.2d

24, 26 (Utah 1990).
We note that Plaintiff's brief does not address
Defendants' argument that the alter-ego theory is ill-suited
for summary judgment because of the factual nature of the
inquiry involved.

This point has been well argued in Cards'

Appellants' Brief, at pp. 16-28, and we do not add to that
argument here.

However, we do challenge Plaintiff's one-sided

factual analysis (Plf's brief at pp. 14-20).

9

1.

CORPORATE FORMALITIES
Plaintiff bases its contention that A.S.M.I, failed to

observe corporate formalities on the Affidavit of Cort
Griffin, Plaintiff's attorney, who has no first-hand knowledge
of any relevant fact in this case.

He only avers that he did

not receive from Defendants particular records of A.S.M.I.
(Brief of Appellee, p. 14.)

This averment is insufficient to

even raise any issue as to whether corporate formalities were
actually observed.

Plaintiff's attorney was competent to

declare only that certain corporate records were not produced,
not that none were kept.

Without evidence that no records

were kept, the formalities issue was not even properly raised
below.
Even if the issue had been raised properly, it was
adequately disputed by other evidence and by each of the
Defendants—sufficiently so as to dispute significant issues
of material fact.

First, the Plaintiff itself submitted the

A.S.M.I. Articles of Incorporation, its stock certificate
records and account ledgers (which had been produced).
Exh. 1, 2)
kept.

(Plfs.

Regular director meetings were held and minutes

(R. 161; see also 343-324)

Defendants Card each

testified that A.S.M.I, and Specialties, Inc. were run
completely separate from each other.

(R. 142-140, 145-144)

Defendant Rasmussen averred that Articles of Incorporation and
other documents pertaining to the formation of the corporation
10

were prepared by the attorney, and that incorporation
formalities occurred in the attorneys' office.

(R. 162,

7,

9-)
Plaintiff claims that Rasmussen's affidavit is
incompetent.

For clarification, the affidavit reads as

follows:
RAY RASMUSSEN, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:

7.
That the Articles of Incorporation
and other legal documents pertaining to
the formation of the corporation were
prepared by Spafford & Spafford, who had
served as attorneys for William C. Card,
and who served as initial registered agent
for the corporation.
8.
That, upon information and belief, he
believes that the by-laws and papers
pertaining to the incorporation meeting
were prepared by said attorneys.
9.
That the formalities of incorporation
occurred in the office of Spafford &
Spafford.

16. That the Board of Directors did meet
regularly, and that minutes were kept.

19. That the two corporations did share
an office, but did not mingle funds, and
did not engage in joint operations.
Plaintiff attempts to downplay the significance of these sworn
statements by arguing that generally averments on "information
11

and belief" do not provoke a genuine issue of fact.

Aside

from the fact that Plaintiff did not challenge the sufficiency
of the affidavit below, a reading of the entire affidavit, in
context, belies Plaintiff's claim here.
Obviously, the assertion in paragraph 8 of Ray
Rasmussen's affidavit does not comprise his entire testimony.
In paragraph 9, Rasmussen states, upon personal knowledge,
that the formalities took place in the attorney's offices.
Paragraphs 7, 9, 16, and 19 of Rasmussen's affidavit are very
specific that corporate formalities were adhered to.
formalities took place.
is irrelevant.

Who actually prepared

The

the documents

Just one sworn statement that disputes one

factual issue is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.

W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Resources Co., 627

P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981).

Ray Rasmussen's affidavit alone

successfully refutes Plaintiff's contentions on summary
judgment and raises specific factual issues.
The only other contention by Plaintiff regarding
Defendants' adherence to formalities is the fact that A.S.M.I,
and Specialties, Inc. shared office space and stamped each
other's mail.

Indeed, such cooperation in everyday business

is not uncommon.

These contentions are clearly not enough to

find "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer
exist."

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 789 P.2d
12

24, 26 (Utah 1990), citing Norman v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979); cL. Block v.
Olympic Health Spa, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 938, 604 P.2d 1317
(1979) (Informality in corporate operation will not lead to
disregard of corporate entity if the informality neither
prejudices nor misleads the plaintiff).
The "formalities" prong of the two-part test for alter
ego is firmly grounded in factual inquiry.

The Court should

not be swayed by Plaintiff's bogged-down attempt to create a
non-issue in Ray Rasmussen's affidavit.

Plaintiff and

Defendants have provided differing factual assertions as to
whether A.S.M.I, adhered to corporate formalities.

Only a

fact-finder can decide which assertions deserve greater weight
and whether plaintiff's circumstantial inferences justify
finding alter-ego.

2.

UNDERCAPITALIZATION
Plaintiff's argument on appeal that A.S.M.I, was

"undercapitalized," is the same argument Plaintiff made below-e.q. that, after

the establishment of A.S.M.I., Defendants

made loans to A.S.M.I.

As a factor of alter ego,

"undercapitalization" does not affect this action on an unpaid
contract.

Plaintiff's argument ignores the proper analysis.

The adequacy of corporate capital is measured at the time
of formation and incorporation.
13

See e.g.# Bischofshausen,

Vasbinder, and Luckie v. D.W. Jaquays Min. and Equipment
Contractors Co,, 700 P.2d 902 (Ariz. App. 1985).

Otherwise,

it can be said that every business that fails is
"undercapitalized" at its end.

The proper inquiry is not

whether A.S.M.I, was "undercapitalized" when it failed but,
rather, was it "undercapitalized" at its inception.

Nowhere

does plaintiff establish by uncontroverted evidence how much
capital was invested in A.S.M.I., how much should have been
invested, or how much would be invested in similarly-situated
companies.

This flaw is fatal to Plaintiff's argument

concerning undercapitalization.
In addition, Plaintiff's undercapitalization argument,
even if valid, avails Plaintiff nothing in this case because
undercapitalization is not relevant in contract cases between
two seasoned, corporate litigants.

The clearest statement of

this rule comes from the Federal District Court:
It is well established that some degree of
moral culpability on the part of the
[Defendant] must be shown to establish
liability for a contract of a [corporate
Defendant] . . . It is particularly so in
contract cases because contracts are
private, consensual relationships in which
each party has a clear and equal
obligation to weigh the potential benefits
and risks of the agreement. Unless fraud
or misrepresentation is involved, there
can be little justification for
disregarding corporate entities which the
parties obviously expected to remain
intact.

14

United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, 439
F.Supp. 610, 617-18 (N.D. Me. 1977); accord White v.
Winchester Land Development Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 63 (Ky. App.
1979); Mills v. U.S.A. Mobile Communications, Inc., 438 S.E.2d
1, 4-5 (W. Va. 1993).

Plaintiff has totally ignored this

principle and these authorities.

Here, a corporate Plaintiff

contracted with the corporate Defendant, A.S.M.I., and thereby
assumed the risk of A.S.M.I.'s inability to pay.

A lack of

corporate capital, even if true, works no fraud or grave
injustice on this Plaintiff.

Under Plaintiff's theory,

shareholders and directors of failed corporations could always
be held personally liable for corporate debts.

3.

A. S.M.I. AND SPECIALTIES, INC. WERE NOT IN "JOINT

VENTURE"
Plaintiff argues that A.S.M.I, and Specialties, Inc. were
a "joint venture" because their incoming mail was jointly
stamped by a common receptionist.

Subsequently, Plaintiff

speculates that outside companies were confused by the "joint
venture" regarding who they were dealing with.

(Brief of

Appellee, p. 17.)
This argument is puzzling, considering Plaintiff
submitted the affidavit of Leslie Southam in which Mr. Southam
asserted that he dealt with A.S.M.I., contracted with A.S.M.I,
as a corporation, and attempted collection from A.S.M.I.
15

He

was not confused or misled by anyone.

Whether other suppliers

may have been confused is entirely speculative and of no avail
to the Plaintiff.

Cf. Almac, Inc. v. JRH Development, Inc.,,

391 N.W.2d 919, 923-24 (Minn. App., 1986); Block, 684 P.2d at
1322.
To support its summary judgment, plaintiff submitted
delivery notices and invoices from other companies who
supplied material to A.S.M.I.
documents was provided.

No foundation for these

Plaintiff simply reads that someone,

at some company, typed a name imprecisely.

Plaintiff

inappropriately supposes that whoever who typed up the
delivery sheet was confused.

It is impossible for Plaintiff

to conclude what was in the mind of the parties who wrote out
those invoices.

They could have made mistakes, the errors

could be typographical, a mere clerk could have recorded one
name while thinking another.

For Plaintiff to speculate that

these outside companies had any question about whom they were
dealing with is just that—speculation.

The argument utterly

lacks evidentiary foundation and should be rejected by this
Court.

4.

OBSERVANCE OF THE CORPORATE FORM OF A.S.M.I. DOES NOT
SANCTION FRAUD, PROMOTE INJUSTICE, OR ALLOW AN
INEQUITABLE RESULT
The Plaintiff merely claims that the loans from

Specialties, Inc. to A.S.M.I, "prove" an inequitable
16

undercaptialization.

However, plaintiff fails to show any

inequity, fraud, or injustice to Plaintiff in this case—an
essential prong to an alter ego analysis.

To meet this prong,

the offending fraudulent conduct must be specifically aimed at
the Plaintiff.

Cf. Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 26.

As noted,

there is no evidence that "undercapitalization" existed.
if it did, there is no inequity to Plaintiff.

Even

If Specialties,

Inc. loaned money to A.S.M.I., the infusion of capital by
loans certainly did not create any "inequity" to Plaintiff.
Almac, Inc. , 391 N.W.2d at 923 (the creation of debt equity
was not an undercapitalization).

If Plaintiff charged

A.S.M.I. $41,000.00 for labor and materials, and now admits
that over $27,000.00 was paid, then clearly Plaintiff
significantly benefited from Defendants' loans to A.S.M.I.
An inequitable result in this case would be to pierce the
corporate veil and to hold Defendants Card personally liable
for debts that were contracted as, and expected by all parties
including the Plaintiff, to remain the corporate debts of
A.S.M.I.

The trial court's decision to pierce the corporate

veil of A.S.M.I, on summary judgment must be reversed.

17

POINT III
EVEN IF THE CORPORATE VEIL OF
A.S.M.I. IS SET ASIDE,
DEFENDANTS CARD ARE NOT
PERSONALLY LIABLE
Plaintiff argues that the Cards are personally liable
just because they were officers or directors of A.S.M.I.
Plaintiff attempts to support that argument with cases
inapplicable to the issues in this case.
Plaintiff cites Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92
(D.C. Cir. 1982), for the proposition that officers or
directors may be held liable.

Labadie Coal does not hold that

an officer or director must bear liability for alter ego.
Instead, the circuit court reversed the trial court's ruling
to leave the corporate veil intact.

The case was returned to

the trial court for further factual consideration whether
defendant officer so controlled the corporation that he should
be held liable on the same theory as a stockholder would be.
In fact, this case supports Defendants' argument that piercing
the corporate veil is a matter best left to a factual
determination.
Labadie Coal has never been cited by any other court as
authority for Plaintiff's proposition here.

Indeed,

Plaintiff's rationale and LaBadie Coal were expressly rejected
in Walk-In Medical Centers, Inc. v. Breuer Capital. Corp., 778
F. Supp. 1116, 1124 (D. Colo. 1991).

18

If, as Plaintiff claims, the issue is only one of
"control," the relevant facts are clearly disputed by
Defendants Card.

(R. 141, 144)

Both Bill and Lane "took no

part in running its business . • . [and] received no
compensation for acting as an officer . . . "

(R. 141, 144;

R. 159). Plaintiff cannot justify summary judgment in the
face of these sworn statements.
If Plaintiff now claims that "control" is its theory,
then the question is a factual one, inappropriate for summary
judgment.

The relative credibility of Cards' sworn

allegations is accepted and not questioned or weighed on
summary j udgment.
Plaintiff stretches its point beyond reason to cases
outside the alter ego arena altogether.

See Rose's Stores,

Inc. v. Padgett, 303 S.E.2d 344 (N.C.App. 1983) (A nonresident
corporate defendant had the minimum requisite contacts with
the forum state for jurisdictional purposes because of the
contacts of its officer/director); Shades Ridge Holding Co.,
Inc. v. U.S., 880 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989), (whether a family
corporation was a taxpayer's nominee for tax purposes);1 and
Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. International Distillers and
Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Dir. 1973) (applying the
Plaintiff's citation Shades Ridge Holding Co., Inc. v.
U.S., 880 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989) was modified and superseded
on rehearing by Shades Ridge Holding Co., Inc. v. U.S., 888 F.2d
725 (11th Cir. 1989).
19

"instrumentality rule" between parent and subsidiary
corporations).

These cases are irrelevant to the issue here

of summary judgment.
Plaintiff does not provide any persuasive authority that
on summary judgment alter ego should extend beyond the
shareholder to reach mere officers and directors.

In Utah,

alter ego is a doctrine of shareholder liability.
Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 26.

If this rule is to be extended

to include nonshareholders, then surely it must be after a
full trial where the facts are fully aired and determined.
If Plaintiff's theory is based upon something other than
"shareholder liability," then such a theory was never pleaded
below and Plaintiff may not now interject new theories to
bolster its pleadings.

See, e.g.. Allisen v. American Legion

Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988).
Plaintiff alleged alter ego.

In this case, the

(A. Comp., R. 91-89.)

The Court

below expressly limited its grant of summary judgment to alter
ego liability.

(R. 253.)

The authorities cited by Plaintiff are neither supportive
nor dispositive of the alter ego issue on summary judgment.
Defendants Card were not shareholders of A.S.M.I, and are not
personally liable for that corporation's debt.
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POINT IV
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEYS FEES AND INTEREST ON
ITS OPEN ACCOUNT
Plaintiff's brief argues that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207
(1953 as amended) justifies the summary award of attorneys
fees and 18% interest.

(Brief of Appellee, p. 11). Again,

Plaintiff misperceives the law and the legal nature of the
open account relationship between Plaintiff and A.S.M.I.

And,

neither Plaintiff nor the lower court relied on the U.C.C. to
justify an award of attorney fees and the high interest rate.
Plaintiff's "periodic billing statements" were not an
"acceptance" as contemplated by Section 70A-2-207.

There is

no evidence in the record as to who made the asserted offer,
or when—or what the terms of the offer were.

Neither does

Plaintiff show whether or when the "offer" was "accepted."
And, Plaintiff ignores that these questions require a factual
inquiry.
In fact, nothing in the record suggests how the alleged
agreement between Plaintiff and A.S.M.I, was arrived at.

The

open account agreement was already in existence before
Plaintiff began performance by delivering goods to A.S.M.I.
(Add. "I").

A "periodic billing statement" which is sent to a

buyer to collect for goods which have already been delivered
cannot automatically alter contract terms which were already
21

assented to prior to performance.

Section 2-207 applies to

terms of an offer at the time of acceptance and not to later
modifications of contracts already in existence.
Plaintiff's roving idea of "acceptance" and modification
would lead to rampant uncertainty between merchants as to
agreed business terms.

Under Plaintiff's argument, any

billing statement containing any language at variance with
contract terms would automatically modify the agreed contract
terms.

Such use of forms to modify terms in an ongoing

relationship has long been addressed and settled.

New "terms"

on attorney fees and interest that first appear in invoices
are not terms of the contract unless clearly bargained for and
assented to by the party billed.

Spanish Fork Packing Co. v.

House of Fine Meats, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186
(1973).

This argument was not addressed by Plaintiff who,

again, tries to hide the relevant issue from the court by
arguing an improper reliance on Section 7QA-2-207.
Even if Section 70A-2-207 applied to this transaction,
Plaintiff's argument fails by the terms of the statute.
Section 2-207(2)(b) states that additional terms in the
"acceptance" that "materially alter" a contract do not become
part of the contract.

Attorney's fees and 18% interest are

certainly "material" terms for which the parties should
bargain and assent.

In this case, the claimed fees and 18%

interest virtually exceed the unpaid account.
22

Such important

terms do not automatically become part of an open account
contract relationship just because the seller decides to add
them on its invoice in microscopic type under a heading of
"Payment Policy."
Attorney's fees and interest language included in
invoices and other "billing statements" after the fact do not
become terms of the contract unless the buyer clearly consents
thereto.

And, in addition to the lack of any such agreement

between A.S.M.I, and Plaintiff, Defendants clearly aver that
they made no such agreements and have no personal liability
under Plaintiff's alter-ego theory.

This issue of fees and

interest is clearly in dispute in this case.

The summary

judgment awarding attorney's fees and interest must be
reversed.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's attempts to redirect this Court onto nonissues and minor points must be disregarded.

Defendants Card

and Specialties, Inc. cannot be held liable on a theory of
alter ego because it is inappropriate to pierce the veil in
this case on summary judgment.

Even if the veil were pierced,

William and Lane Card could not be held liable due to their
lack of shareholder status and lack of participation in
management and control of A.S.M.I.

Also, the Plaintiff is not

entitled to attorneys fees and interest.
23

Therefore, the summary judgment of the circuit court must
be set aside and the case remanded for a fact trial under the
proper legal standards.
Respectfully submitted this

LA

day of April, 1994.

ciarTc R. Nielsen
Stepherf L. Henriod
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN
Attorneys for Appellants
William C* and Wm. Lane Card
and Architectural
Specialties, Inc.
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ADDENDUM C
Affidavit William C. Card, R. 142-140
filed 3/13/92

FILED
R. Steven Chambers (0613)
Attorney f o r d e f e n d a n t s Card,
and A r c h i t e c t u r a l S p e c i a l t i e s ,
350 South 400 East
S u i t e 114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 322-3411

^

^

'

Fourth Judicial District Court
0 , Utah County StauoHnah
W ^ B S ^ H . Clerk

Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOUTHAM AND WARBURTON ALUMINUM
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM C. CARD

vs.
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation, ARCHITECTURAL
SPECIALTIES, INC., a Utah corporation, WILLIAM C. CARD,
WILLIAM LANE CARD, and
and ROY RASMUSSEN,

Civil No. CV 89 102

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
William C. Card, being

first duly

sworn upon his oath,

deposes and says:
1.

I am

one

of

the defendants

in this case and have

personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

If called to

testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit.
2.

Architectural Specialties, Inc., is a Utah corporation

whose shareholders are myself and my son William Lane Card.

The

Addendum C

142

two of us manage its business.

At no time has Ray Rasmussen been

involved in the management of Architectural Specialties, Inc.

It

was formed to provide specialty work in connection with building
construction, such as doors, windows, and the like.
3.

Architectural Sheet Metal was a corporation formed by

Ray Rasmussen to carry on sheet metal work such as heating and
air conditioning duct work and the like.

The line of work of

Architectural Sheet Metal was completely different from that of
Architectural Specialties.
4.

The

shareholders

of

Architectural

Sheet

Metal

were

Architectural Specialties, William Griswold and Ray Rasmussen.
At no time have I been a shareholder of Architectural

Sheet

Metal.
5.

Although I was listed as an officer of Architectural

Sheet Metal, I took no part in the running of its business.

Ray

Rasmussen had control over the operation of that business and did
not consult with me regarding
compensation

for acting

as

its operation.

I received no

an officer of Architectural

Sheet

Metal.
6.

Architectural

Specialties

did

not

make

use

of

Architectural Sheet Metal's funds or assets.
7.

Architectural Specialties filed its own tax return and

did not include any income derived by Architectural Sheet Metal.
8.

Although

Architectural

Specialties

and

Architectural

Sheet Metal were operated out of the same office, they did not
share employees or bank accounts.
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9.
Sheet

Neither Ray Rasmussen
Metal

was

authorized

nor anyone
to

sign

from Architectural

any

documents

for

Architectural Specialties.
10.

I have reviewed the invoices submitted by the plaintiff

in connection with its motion for summary judgment.

The persons

who signed those invoices were not an officer or director of
Architectural

Specialties,

were

not

authorized

to

bind

Architectural Specialties, nor were those persons an agent of
myself nor similarly authorized to bind me.

I believe that these

persons signed the invoices simply because they happened to be
present when the materials were delivered.

I had no knowledge of

these invoices prior to my review for this Affidavit.
11.

To the best of my knowledge there has never been a

written agreement between Architectural Specialties or myself on
the one hand and the plaintiff on the other hand regarding goods
purchased from plaintiff.
Further the affiant sayeth naught.
Dated March 11, 1992.

ys~\ /

Q\

C. Car<
Subscribed and sworn to before me on March 11, 1992.

Commission expires:

J
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ADDENDUM D
Affidavit Wm. Lane Card, R. 145-143
filed 3/3/92

FILED
R. Steven Chambers (0613)
Attorney for defendants Card,
and Architectural Specialties, Inc.
350 South 400 East
Suite 114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 322-3411

3 ( 5

Fourth Judicial Olttrlet Court
of Utah Courm Stan of Utah
CARMA ti SMITH Clark
—
^W-t
Oaputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOUTHAM AND WARBURTON ALUMINUM
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM LANE CARD

vs.
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation, ARCHITECTURAL
SPECIALTIES, INC., a Utah corporation, WILLIAM C. CARD,
WILLIAM LANE CARD, and
and ROY RASMUSSEN,

Civil No. CV 89 102

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
William Lane Card, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and says:
1.

I am

one

of

the defendants

in this case and have

personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

If called to

testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit.
2.

I

am

not

and

have

never

been

a

shareholder

Architectural Sheet Metal.

Addendum D
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of

3-

Although I was listed as an officer of Architectural

Sheet Metal, I took no part in the running of its business.

Ray

Rasmussen had control over the operation of that business and did
not consult with me
compensation

regarding

for acting

its operation.

I received

as an officer of Architectural

no

Sheet

Metal.
4.

I have reviewed the invoices submitted by the plaintiff

in connection with its motion for summary judgment.
who

signed

those

Architectural
Architectural

The person

invoices was not an officer or director of

Specialties,
Specialties,

nor

was

not

was

authorized

that

myself nor similarly authorized to bind me.

person

an

to

bind

agent

of

I believe that this

person signed these invoices simply because he happened to be
present when the materials were delivered.

I had no knowledge of

these invoices prior to my review for this Affidavit.
5.

To the best of my knowledge there has never been a

written agreement between Architectural Specialties or myself on
the one hand and the plaintiff on the other hand regarding goods
purchased from plaintiff.
6.

I have read the Affidavit of William C. Card, submitted

herewith, and agree with all the statements therein.

All those

statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief.
Further the affiant sayeth naught.
Dated March 11, 1992.

*

^

William Lane Card
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Subscribed and sworn to before me on March 11,

.SNXSRP*0

<&A^~.

Notary Public
Residing at:
Commission expires:
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ADDENDUM G
Exhibit 4
Southam-Warburton "Invoices"
to
A.S.M.I (4 of 11)

SOUTHAM-WARBURTON ALUMINUM
450 Wast State
Pleasant Grove. Utah 34062
801 785-3551
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ADDENDUM I
Exhibit 9
Affidavit of L. Southam
(in support of Summary Judgment)

RAY M. HARDING, JR., Bar No. 1363
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN, Bar No. 5711
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C
Attorney for Defendant
306 West Main Street
P.O. Box 126
American Fork, UT 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-7658
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON ALUMINUM
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
LESLIE R. SOUTHAM

)

ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INCa Utah Corporation, RAY
RASMUSSEN; WILLIAM LANE CARD;
WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM L.
GRISWOLD; AND ARCHITECTURAL
SPECIALTIES, INC. a Utah
Corporation
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
:
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No.

CV-89-102

)

ss

Leslie R. Southam, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and says:
1. That I am the Vice President of Southam and Warburton
Aluminum Company, the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; and
that in such capacity, I have personal knowledge of the facts set
forth in this Affidavit.
2. Southam and Warburton Aluminum Company provided labor
and material to Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal Inc. in the
1
Addendum I

amount of $13,855.74 on and between August 14, 1986 and March 12,
1987.
3. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal was billed for
the above stated amount.
4. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal did not, and has
not at any time, indicated to Plaintiff that the labor and
material were not satisfactory, nor have the Defendants returned
any of the materials nor requested that additional work be done.
5. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal has failed to pay
on this matter despite the fact that demand has been made
therefore.
DATED this /yQ
day of October^1991.

and sworn .to
to I before me this
Subscribed apd
October, 1991, by ^ ^ A c / f . ^ W - ^ .

day of

^7^/2^^^
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING IN:
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served this REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS CARD AND ARCHITECTURAL SPECIALTIES, INC. by mailing
two copies by first class mail, postage prepaid on the C^
day of April, 1994 to:
Ray M. Harding, Jr.
James "Tucker" Hansen
HARDING & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
306 West Main
American Fork, UT 84003
W. Andrew McCullough
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Rasmussen and Griswold
930 South State #10
Orem, UT 84058
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